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I. INTRODUCTION
Should insider trading be punished? One might argue that a true
capitalistic economy is dependent upon inequalities among its parti-
cipants.' An attempt to regulate and balance these inequalities may
ultimately have an adverse effect on the economy, since capitalism
is dependent upon inequalities. 2 Those who espouse this view would
contend that insider trading is an acceptable practice because it is
inherently founded on inequalities among market participants. Any
regulations on insider trading may pose a threat to capitalism.
The European Community and the United States have rejected the
view that attempts to regulate securities trading may hinder the
economy.3 Under either system, profiting from inside information at
the expense of other investors poses a threat to the proper operation
1. B. RIDER & H. FrENcH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TakDINO xiii (1979) [hereinafter
RIDR AND FFRENCH].
2. Id.
3. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 875 (2d Cir. 1968). See CoMMUi -
CATION FROM THE CoMInssION TO THE PARLIAMENT, AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL
DIREcTivE COORDINATING REGULATIONS ON INSIDER TAINo - COMMON POSITION OF THE
COUNcIL, COMmiSSiON OF THE EUrROPEAN COMMUNTIES 2 (July 20, 1989) [hereinafter AMENDED
PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL DRcEriE], stating that "Insider trading, in which the insider takes
advantage of privileged information to trade profitably in securities, is a threat to the proper
operation and the development of securities markets." See Berger, Issuer Recovery of Insider
Trading Profits Under Section 25502.5 of the California Corporation Code, 21 PAC. L.J. 221,
222 (1990) [hereinafter Berger]. Professor Berger notes that "even though persistent arguments
have been made by some economists that insider trading is good for the trading markets as a
whole and should be permitted, the overwhelming reaction in fact has consistently been
regarded as 'unfair' because it destroys the 'level playing field' among participants in the
trading markets." Id.
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of the securities markets because it undermines the equal opportunity
of investors in securities transactions.4 Regulating and sanctioning
insider trading is intended to eliminate the inequalities inherent in a
system where participants have unequal access to information. 5 Pro-
ponents of insider trading regulations argue that decreasing unequal
access and use of material information will enhance investor confi-
dence, thus creating a stronger and more active market.
6
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome (Treaty) created the European Eco-
nomic Community.7 The primary purpose of the Treaty was to
establish a community-wide economic market. 8 In order to achieve
this market, the Treaty promulgates four objectives, one of which is
the freedom of capital movement. 9 The Council Directive of Novem-
ber 13, 1989 was designed to aid in the fulfillment of the objective
of freedom of capital movement.' 0
The European Community finance ministers adopted the Council
Directive in order to harmonize insider trading laws throughout the
European Community (EC)." The Directive, which will become ef-
4. PROPOSAL FOR A CouNcn; Dnmtcriv COORDNATINO REGULATIONS ON INSIDER TR.ADNG
PRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION, COMInSSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 2 (May 21, 1987)
[hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR CouNcL DmncTIvE]. The Commission stated that
[c]onsequently, insider trading, which enables persons with inside information to
make gains at the expense of other investors, constitutes a threat to the proper
operation of the securities markets, since it totally undermines equality of opportunity
for investors and therefore also their confidence in those markets. If the proper
operation of those markets is to be safeguarded, it is therefore essential to eliminate




6. Council Directive of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing,
O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 334) 30, at preamble 1 (1989) [hereinafter Directive]. The entire text
of the Directive is reprinted at Appendix I to this Comment. (footnotes omitted). See Berger,
supra note 3, at 222.
7. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Currently, the European Economic Community is comprised of
12 Member States: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Common Market in Profile, I
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 101.07 (1987).
8. Note, Toward the Unification of European Capital Markets: The EEC's Proposed
Directive on Insider Trading, 11 FoRniwH INT'L L.J. 432, 433 (1988) [hereinafter Note,
Unification.].
9. EEC Treaty, supra note 7; Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 345, 345 (1982) [hereinafter Cruickshank]. The other three objectives are not directly
relevant to the Insider Trading Directive.
10. Directive, supra note 6, at preamble.
11. New EC Insider Trading Ban Extends to Secondary Insiders, Corp. Couns. Weekly
(BNA), at 4-5 (Nov. 29, 1989) [hereinafter Insider Trading Ban]. The Council contains
representatives from each of the Member States. This body performs the legislative functions
of the European Communities. Recent Development, Insider Trading and the EEC: Harmo-
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fective on June 1, 1992,12 was promulgated on the belief that the
free flow of capital depends upon a smoothly operating market. 3
Investors must have confidence in the market in order for the market
to function effectively. 14 Further, investor confidence is based par-
tially upon the belief that all investors are on an equal footing with
each other and that they will be protected from the improper use of
inside information.' s
Currently, within the EC, only Denmark, France and the United
Kingdom have adopted legislation sanctioning the exploitation of
inside information. 16 The other nine Member States have either
voluntary regulations, or none at all. 17 The Directive is intended to
coordinate rules and regulations at the Community Level. 8 By uni-
fying the safeguards in the various securities markets, the EC will
enhance the securities interpenetration of these markets19 which is
necessary for the development of a true unitary European securities
market. 2o
This comment explores the meaning and effects of the Directive
and its potential ramifications on the Member States. The analysis
is divided into two parts. Articles 1 through 4 of the Directive are
the primary articles pertaining to the imposition of restrictions. Part
II of this comment analyzes and compares the Articles to the current
United States statutory and common law regarding insider trading.
The U.S. insider trading law is utilized as a guidepost because U.S.
law provides the most highly developed regulations on insider trad-
ing.21
Part III of the comment analyzes the ramifications of the Direc-
tive's Article 13. Article 13 permits each Member State to "determine
the penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures taken
nization of the Insider Trading Laws of the Member States, 8 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. Rnv.
151, 163 (1985). The European Economic Communities shall hereinafter be identified as the
EEC.
12. Insider Trading Ban, supra note 11, at 4-5.
13. Directive, supra note 6, at preamble, 8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 11 9, 10.
16. Note, Unification, supra note 8, at 438.
17. Id. Those Member States with voluntary regulations do not require market participants
to abide by the regulations. Id. at 442-44.
18. PROPOSAL FOR CouNcrr. Dncna'r, supra note 4, at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. RImER & FFRENCH, supra note 1, at xiv. Anti-insider trading regulations originated in
the United States, and the United States law has been used as a model in numerous other
countries. Id.
234
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pursuant to this Directive." Through a comparative analysis of the
current laws and attitudes towards insider trading among the Member
States and in the United States, Part III addresses the potential lack
of effectiveness of Article 13.2
II. RESTRCTIONS
The Directive contains three restrictions on insider trading. First,
Article 2 prohibits an insider24 from taking advantage of inside
information in order to invest in securities related to that informa-
tion.? This restriction applies whether the insider is benefiting himself
or another, either directly or indirectly. 26 Second, Article 4 imposes
this same restriction on tippees.27 Third, Article 3 restricts insiders
from disclosing inside information to third parties, and from rec-
ommending that third parties engage in securities transactions based
on inside information.?
Two main areas of concern arise from these restrictions. The first
area relates to the question of who is subject to the restrictions
imposed on insiders and tippees. The second area involves a deter-
mination of what type of information is considered inside informa-
tion. The analysis of these two areas entails a comparison between
the Directive and statutorily and judicially developed insider trading
laws in the United States.
A. Insiders and Tippees
1. Insiders
Article 2 characterizes an insider as a person who possesses infor-
mation "by virtue of his membership in the administrative, manage-
ment or supervisory bodies of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in
the capital of the issuer, or because he has access to such information
by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties." 29
22. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 13.
23. Id. Article 13 of the Directive requires each Member State to "determine the penalties
to be applied for infringement of the measures taken pursuant to [the] Directive." Id.
24. See infra p. 235 (insider analysis).
25. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 2, 1.
26. Id.
27. Id. at art. 4. See infra p. 242 (tippee analysis).
28. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 3, 1.
29. Id. at art. 2, 1.
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In essence, Article 2 describes an insider as any person who, by
reason of his professional position, is likely to have access to inside
information.
30
In the United States, the primary sources of insider trading res-
trictions have been Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193431 and Rule lOb-532 promulgated thereunder by the Securities
Exchange Commission. 3  Rule lOb-5 prohibits "any person" from
trading or recommending trading on the basis of inside information.34
Subsequent common law has restricted the broadly termed "any
person" categorization as pertaining solely to insiders and tippees a5
(a) United States - Chiarella
On May 18, 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided
Chiarella v. United States.36 The Chiarella decision changed prior
law with respect to determining who should be considered an insider,
and thus, be subjected to insider trading restrictions.3 7 The defendant
30. Id.; PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, at 4.
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7Shh-I (1970).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
33. Block, Barton & Babich, SEC Litigation: Private Rights of Action for Illegal Insider
Trading, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 299, 299 (1987). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange - . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970). The Securities and Exchange
Commission promulgated Rule lOb-5 under Section 10(b). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the malls, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) To engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
For the purposes of this Comment, it is not necessary to discuss other theories of insider
trading liability in the United States, including those arising under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(1985).
34. A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, § 66.02[a][i] at 3-451 (1989)
[hereinafter JAcoBs].
35. Id.
36. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
37. S. ARKIN, TRADING ON INSIDE INFORMATION - PROBLEMS OF DEFINING, DETECTING,
PROSECUTING, AND DEFENDING INSIDER TRADING CASES 29-31 (1984) [hereinafter ARKIN].
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in Chiarella, Vincent Chiarella, was a mark-up man for a financial
printing company. 8 A portion of his employment responsibilities
consisted of handling documents used in connection with tender
offers and other acquisitions of targeted companies before the offers
were publicly announced.39 Through these documents, Chiarella was
able to identify the targeted companies. ° Based on information
contained in the documents, the defendant purchased shares of the
targeted companies, and after public announcement of the acquisi-
tions, sold the shares at a profit.41 The government, represented by
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), subsequently brought a
criminal suit for insider trading against Chiarella.
42
The main issue in Chiarella was whether Chiarella should be
regarded as an insider and thus, subject to the insider trading
restrictions imposed by Rule lOb-5. The government argued that
Chiarella was an insider, based on the holding in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company.43 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit did
not put a limitation on who was subject to the obligation of either
abstaining from trading or disclosing the inside information possessed
by that person," nor did the court base its decision on a fiduciary
concept. Instead, the court emphasized that its decision was "based
in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively
equal access to material information. '45 Thus, anyone who possessed
information, regardless of how that person obtained the information,
was subject to the "disclose or abstain" rule."





43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Coates v. S.E.C., 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The disclose or abstain rule relied on in Chiarella was derived from a Securities
Exchange Commission decision. Id. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
[Tihe [Securities Exchange] Commission decided that a corporate insider must abstain
from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material
inside information known to him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information [which] has been traditionally
imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stock-
holders. We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material
facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known
to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment.
Id.
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Deriving its argument from the holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
the SEC focused on the fact that the defendant had greater than
normal access to material information regarding the acquisition of
targeted companies. 47 The SEC contended that Chiarella had de-
frauded his employer's customers by misappropriating confidential
information from them.48 The government further argued that Chi-
arella had engaged in fraud against the investors who sold him the
targeted companies' securities when he used the misappropriated
information for personal gain without public disclosure. 49 However,
the government had failed to utilize these misappropriation theories
when it presented its case to the jury, so the Supreme Court refused
to consider the theories. 50
The Supreme Court concentrated on the Second Circuit's holding,
which took the "equal access to material information" rationale of
Texas Gulf Sulphur to its logical conclusion.5 The Second Circuit
had concluded that anyone "who regularly receives material 2
nonpublic53 information may not use that information to trade se-
curities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. And if he
cannot disclose, he must abstain from buying or selling." '5 4 The
Second Circuit further held that Chiarelia obtained the material
nonpublic information through his position as a financial printer and
thus was prohibited from trading on the basis of this information. 55
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Powell, held that "a duty to disclose under Section 10b does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information. 5 6
In order for a duty of disclosure to be found, a fiduciary duty, or
other similar relationship of trust and confidence must exist between
the party who possesses the information and the party who is entitled
to the information.5 7 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the Texas
Gulf Sulphur holding, and took a narrower approach, recognizing
47. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
48. Id. at 227-30.
49. Id. at 235.
50. Id. at 236.
51. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978). See D. LAoGVooRT, INSIDER
TRADING REGULATION 55 (1988) [hereinafter LANGEvooRr].
52. See infra p. 248 (discussion of "material").
53. See infra p. 251 (discussion of "nonpublic").
54. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365.
55. Id. at 1367-68.
56. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
57. Id. at 228. See id. at n.55 (description of a fiduciary; duty limited absent explicit
evidence of Congressional intent).
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that the presence of a fiduciary duty for failure to disclose was
paramount when imposing liability.
Applying a fiduciary standard to the facts in Chiarella, the Court
found that "no duty could arise from [Mr. Chiarella's] relationship
with the sellers of the targeted company's securities, for [Chiarella]
had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, not a
fiduciary, and not a person in whom the sellers had placed their
trust and confidence.""8 Although Chiarella knowingly received non-
public information in his business capacity, he was not considered
an insider because he had no fiduciary relationship with the sellers.
(b) The Directive: Application of Article 2 to the Chiarella Facts:
First Interpretation
If Chiarella were to be decided under the Directive, presumably
the outcome would be different from the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision. Applying Article 2 of the Directive to the facts of Chiarella,
the defendant possessed inside information59 concerning tender offers
and other acquisitions of targeted companies before that information
was made available to the public. Furthermore, Chiarella obtained
this information "by virtue of the exercise of his employment."
6
Mr. Chiarella's conduct in deciphering documents in order to
discover the identity of the targeted companies, buying shares of five
different targeted companies, and subsequently selling the shares at
a profit after the tender offer was announced, indicates that Chiarella
had "full knowledge of the facts" as required by Article 2.61 The
Directive's requirement that the defendant must have actual knowl-
edge of the facts is distinguishable from the requirement under U.S.
law that an individual either know or should know that the infor-
mation is nonpublic. The Directive's scope is narrower, since it applies
only to those individuals who possess "full knowledge of the facts,"
not to those who should have full knowledge of the facts. In order
for a plaintiff to bring a cause of action under the Directive, he or
she must establish that the defendant actually knew of the facts,
regardless of whether a reasonable person would have been aware of
them.
58. Id. at 232-33.
59. See infra p. 247 (analysis of inside information).
60. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 2, 1.
61. Id.
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Take for example, a janitor who is employed at a brokerage firm
and stumbles upon material inside information while performing his
janitorial duties, and later uses that information in securities trading.
The janitor may have violated the knowledge requirement in Chi-
arella, but he has not necessarily violated Article 2 of the Directive.
The janitor may be held to have violated Chiarella if a reasonable
janitor under the same or similar circumstances would have known
that the information was nonpublic. Under Article 2 of the Directive,
where a janitor knows nothing about the significance of the securities
which he comes across, that janitor may not be considered an insider
since he did not have full knowledge of the facts. Therefore, sanctions
may not be imposed upon the janitor for trading on the information
obtained or for disclosing that information to a third party. Although
the lack of a reasonable person standard in Article 2 is a significant
difference between the Directive and the Chiarella requirement, the
outcome under this set of facts is not affected since Chiarella had
full knowledge of the facts. Mr. Chiarella intentionally deciphered
the code to get at the information, indicating he knew the information
was nonpublic and material.
Finally, Mr. Chiarella took advantage of the information he had
obtained by purchasing securities of the targeted companies prior to
public announcement of that information. Under the Directive, Mr.
Chiarella would be considered an insider since he (1) had obtained
the information by virtue of the exercise of his employment, (2) had
full knowledge of the facts with respect to that information, and (3)
took advantage of the information by purchasing securities based on
that information. His trading actions would thus be subject to the
restrictions and penalties imposed by the Directive.
The Directive does not explicitly require a person to have a
fiduciary relationship in order for that person to be considered an
insider.62 Lack of a fiduciary duty requirement is the main difference
between the Directive and the holding in Chiarella, bringing the
Directive's definition of an insider closer to that used in the United
62. Id. Article 2, I of the Directive prohibits any person who:
by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies
of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or because he has
access to such information by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession
or duties, possesses inside information from taking advantage of that information
with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account
or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities
of the issuer or issuers to which that information relates.
Id. There is a clear absence of a fiduciary duty element in this definition.
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States prior to the Chiarella decision.6 Judicial interpretation of Rule
10b-5 has subsequently evolved to impose a fiduciary duty element
as a prerequisite to being branded an "insider." 64 Rule lOb-5 states
that it "shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. ' 65 The language which specifies fraud as a
requirement for a finding of unlawful conduct is the basis for
incorporating a fiduciary requirement into the insider definition under
U.S. common law. 6 Article 2 of the Directive is completely devoid
of language suggesting fraud as a basis for unlawful activity; there-
fore, subsequent judicial interpretation creating a fiduciary duty
element is doubtful. 67
(c) The Directive: Application of Article 2 to the Chiarella
Facts: Second Interpretation
A second interpretation of Article 2 exists. Although Article 2 does
not specifically define an insider, it applies to only three classes of
persons who have access to information: members of "the adminis-
trative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer;" holders of
the issuer's capital; and those who gain the information through
"exercise of his employment, profession or duties. ' 68 In all three
categories, people who may be considered insiders have access to
inside information through their professional positions. Generally,
people who hold such positions are bound by certain fiduciary duties,
including a duty of confidentiality.69 Thus, one might infer a fiduciary
duty requirement in classifying a person as an insider under the
63. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom. Coates v. S.E.C., 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961);
Ayaxu, supra note 37, at 24-27; LANGEvooRT, supra note 51, at 37-49,
64. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 222 (1980).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1987) (emphasis added).
66. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. "When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure,
there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak .... A duty to disclose under section 10(b) does
not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." Id. See also Note,
Securities - Insider Trading - The Effects of the New EEC Draft Insider Trading Directive,
18 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 119, 134 (1988), stating "[blecause the ... Directive makes no
mention of fraud, which is the basis for the incorporation of a fiduciary element into the
United States definition, it appears unlikely that the fiduciary element will attach, for the
definition is self-contained." Id.
67. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 2, 1.
68. Id.
69. But see Section II(A)(2)(c) infra p. 245 (holder of the issuer of capital may not be
fiduciary).
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Directive. This approach further narrows the scope of Article 2, and
is not readily apparent from the Article's explicit language. The
Chiarella facts, viewed under this interpretation of Article 2, would




Article 4 of the Directive defines the prohibitions to be imposed
on tippees.70 It defines tippees as those who knowingly obtain infor-
mation, directly or indirectly, from insiders. 71 Article 4 states that
"[e]ach Member State shall impose the prohibition provided for in
Article 2 on any person other than those referred to in that Article
who with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside information,
the direct or indirect source of which could not be other than a
person referred to in Article 2.'72 That is, the Directive treats a
tippee as an insider when the tippee gets information which he knows
is inside information directly or indirectly from an insider. Put
another way, when a person has inside information which he knows
the general public does not possess, he is subject to the restrictions
of the Directive. The primary rationale for regulating tippee action
under Article 4 is that as a result of a tippee's direct or indirect
association with an insider, the tippee gains the same access to
material information as does the insider.7 3 The drafters of the Direc-
tive recognized the significant risk of individuals procuring infor-
mation from insiders to benefit themselves 4 and thus extended
potential liability to tippees.7
5
(b) United States - Dirks v. SEC
The current U.S. definition of a tippee is derived from the holding
in Dirks v. S.E.C. .76 In Dirks, the defendant was an officer of a
broker-dealer who specialized in providing investment analyses to
70. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 4.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1.
73. AmmNDED PROPOSAL FOR CouNcr DmacTnrv, supra note 3, at 5.
74. PROPOSAL FOR CouNcr Dm crtw, supra note 4, at 4.
75. Id.
76. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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institutional investors. Ronald Secrist, an officer of Equity Funding
of America, an insurance company, informed Dirks that Equity
Funding of America's earnings were overstated due to fraudulent
corporate activities. Secrist urged Dirks to investigate and publicly
announce the fraud. Based on the information that Dirks received
from Secrist and upon information that Dirks subsequently gathered,
he informed his clients of the fraud to enable them to sell their
Equity Funding stock before the fraud became public knowledge.
After his clients sold their shares, Dirks publicly announced the
fraud, and the value of the stock subsequently decreased.7 7 Thus,
due to the inside information provided by Dirks, his clientele avoided
incurring losses.
78
Justice Powell, again writing the majority opinion for the Supreme
Court, extended the fiduciary relationship principle stated in Chiarella
to tippee liability.79 He emphasized that a fiduciary duty is the sole
basis for "abstain or disclose liability."0 The Court held that an
insider owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders when disclosing
information to the tippee. When the insider discloses information to
the tippee, the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach of this fiduciary duty. 81 Thus, a breach of a fiduciary duty
by an insider is a prerequisite to an imposition of liability on a
tippee. Based on these facts, the Court found that Dirks was not
liable as a tippee.
82
Such a breach by an insider was not found in Dirks, and therefore
no tippee liability could be found. Although the Court in Dirks
found that Secrist was an insider, Secrist had no intention of either
benefiting himself or Dirks. Thus Secrist had not violated his fidu-
77. Id. at 650-52.
78. Id. at 649.
79. LANGovooT, supra note 51, at 168.
80. Id. The author states that "[a]fter Chiarella, it can safely be said that a person
violates rule 10b-5 by trading on material nonpublic information without disclosing that
information to the marketplace-the essence of the abstain or disclose theory-if and only if
he owes a fiduciary duty to market-place traders." Id.
81. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
82. Id. at 665. The Court stated
[i]t is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no pre-
existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. He took no action, directly or indirectly,
that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or
confidence in him. There was no expectation by Dirk's [sic] sources that he would
keep their information confident. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain
the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders breached their ... duty
to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no
duty when he passed it on to investors ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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ciary duty to Equity Funding shareholders by providing Dirks with
the inside information. Secrist's intention was only to expose the
fraud. Without a breach by Secrist, "there was no derivative breach
by Dirks."' 83 Thus, Dirks could not be held liable for insider trading
as a tippee.
84
The Dirks rationale is distinguishable from the approach taken in
Article 4 regarding tippee liability. Underlying the Directive's restric-
tion on tippees is the rationale of avoiding inequalities in access to
material information. 85 Tippee liability under Dirks is based on an
extension of the fiduciary duty obligation of the insider.86 Under
Dirks, tippees are held liable because of their participation in the
insider's breach of his fiduciary duty, which occurs when the insider
discloses information to the tippee.
87
It must be noted, however, that Dirks did not directly address
liability with respect to remote tippees; tippees who receive infor-
mation indirectly from an insider. Commentators have generally
expressed three interpretations of Dirks with respect to remote tip-
pees.8 8 Under a strict interpretation of Dirks, the person conveying
the inside information to the remote tippee must be an insider. 9 A
broader interpretation of Dirks would impose a fiduciary duty on
the tippee and create a chain of persons with a duty to disclose so
long as it could be shown that each person in the chain: (1) was
given the information expressly for the purpose of facilitating trading
based on inside information, (2) knew that the information was
material and not public, and (3) knew or had reason to know that
it came to him as a result of some breach of duty by an insider. 90
The last possible interpretation, the approach taken by the Direc-
tive, is to "base liability simply on a showing that the person came
into possession of information that he knew was material and non-
83. Id. at 666-67.
84. Id.
85. PROPOSAL FOR CouNcl DmEcTnrE, supra note 4, at 4.
86. LANGEVOORT, supra note 51, at 118.
87. Id.
88. See JACOBS, supra note 34, § 66.02[a][ii][F] at 3-494.23; LANoEvOORT, supra note 51,
at 143-46.
89. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). See JACOBS, supra note 34, § 66.02[a][ii][F]
at 3-494.23; LAN EvooRT, supra note 51, at 143-44 (interpretation would allow tippees to tip
others without subjecting them to liability where insider only sought to benefit from initial
tip).
90. LANGEVOORT, supra note 51, at 144 (case where insider relates inside information to
friend, and friend tells another he has just received a hot tip from an insider).
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public and which he knew or had reason to know was obtained via
a breach of fiduciary duty by an insider." 91
(c) Application of the Dirks Facts to Article 4
Dirks may have been analyzed differently under Article 4 of the
Directive. The Directive encompasses a broader range of potential
tippees than does the strict interpretation of Dirks. Under the strict
interpretation of Dirks, the person conveying the inside information
to the tippee must be an insider. 92 Under the Directive, the person
conveying the information to the tippee does not necessarily have to
be an insider since the tippee could receive the information indirectly
from another tippee or from a third party. The first requirement of
defining a person as a tippee under the Directive is met if a person
receives inside information, the source of which can ultimately be
traced to an insider. 93 This approach is similar to the third interpre-
tation of Dirks stated above. The two additional requirements of the
Directive are that the tippee must have "full knowledge of the facts,"
and he must benefit either "his own account or ... the account of
a third party, either directly or indirectly" by acquiring or disposing
of the pertinent securities. 94
Dirks may also have been analyzed differently under the Directive
because of a potential difference in the fiduciary duty requirements.
A fiduciary duty is not explicitly required to characterizing an insider
as such under the Directive. Although some of the specified employ-
ment positions enumerated in Article 2 seem to be fiduciary posi-
tions,95 not all are.96 Although most of these positions seem to involve
a fiduciary relationship, what is meant by "holding in the capital of
the issuer" 97 is not readily apparent. This language seems to apply
to shareholders98 who do not typically owe a fiduciary obligation to
the issuer of the securities. Due to the lack of a fiduciary duty
requirement in the second category of potential insiders, a fiduciary
relationship may not be implicit in the Article 2 definition of an
91. Id. at 145 (situation where person overhears improper tip given by insider to tippee).
92. JAcoBs, supra note 34, § 66.02[a][ii][F] at 3-494.23.
93. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 4, 1.
94. Id.
95. Id. at art. 2, $1.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Due to the explicit language of Article 2, it is not absolutely clear that the drafters
intended this provision to apply solely to shareholders. Further, no legislative history is
available concerning where this category originated.
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insider. To further support the argument that a fiduciary relationship
is not required in Article 2's definition of an insider, the Directive
specifies only certain positions without using the word "fiduciary."
This may imply that the drafters did not intend to require a fiduciary
duty in the Directive's characterization of an insider. 99
This lack of a fiduciary duty makes the Directive broader than
Dirks, since a wider range of people could be considered insiders
and tippees. Further, the same rationale for distinguishing the judicial
expansion of insider liability in the United States from potential
judicial expansion of insider liability in the EC applies to potential
judicial expansion of tippee liability in the EC. The basis of the
fiduciary relationship requirement in the United States is founded in
the specific language of Rule 1Ob-5 pertaining to fraud. 10 One cannot
act fraudulently unless that person owes a fiduciary duty to the other
person; or, put another way, finding a fiduciary duty is a prerequisite
to finding fraudulent activity. In contrast, Article 4 is devoid of
language suggesting fraud as an element for imposing liability. As a
result, future judicial interpretation among the Member States is not
likely to require a fiduciary duty element for an imposition of tippee
liability. 101
99. Article 4 states:
Each member state shall impose the prohibition provided for in Article 2 on any
person other than those referred to in that Article who with full knowledge of the
facts possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of which could not
be other than a person referred to in Article 2.
Directive, supra note 6, at art. 4, 1. Neither Article 2 nor Article 4 contain any language
suggesting a fiduciary duty requirement.
100. Rule 10b-5 provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, . . [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240 (1987) (emphasis added).
101. Directive, supra note 6, at arts. 2, 1, 4, 1. In the United States, several judicially
created theories of imposing the existence of a fiduciary duty have been expounded. In footnote
14 of Dirks, the court confirmed the existence of "temporary" or "constructive" insiders.
Under this theory, the basis for recognizing a fiduciary duty by an outsider of the corporation,
such as an underwriter, or accountant, is that they have "entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes." Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 656 n.14 (1983). In United
States v. Newman, the Second Circuit applied the misappropriation theory. United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). Under this theory,
"misappropriation of confidential information by an employee gives rise to a breach of a duty
to his employer and may constitute a fraud prosecutable under § 10(b)." Axml, supra note
37, at 35. Because it is unlikely that subsequent judicial interpretation will create a fiduciary
duty requirement imposing the Directive's restrictions, these theories for finding a fiduciary
duty are inapplicable to the situation presented by the Directive.
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Applying Article 4 of the Directive to the facts of Dirks, the
defendant, Dirks, would not be found to be a tippee. 102 Dirks had
full knowledge that the inside information had not yet been disclosed
to the public. In addition, Dirks used the information to benefit
third parties, his clientele, by giving them the opportunity to divest
their shares in Equity Funding before public disclosure. However, in
order for Article 4 of the Directive to apply to the facts in Dirks,
Dirks would have had to have received the inside information either
directly or indirectly from an insider, as defined in Article 2.103 In
fact, Dirks obtained the inside information concerning fraudulent
corporate practices from Secrist. Although Secrist obtained the in-
formation by virtue of his position as an officer of Equity Funding,
he would not be considered an insider under Article 4 because he
had no intention of benefitting either himself, Dirks, or Dirks'
clientele.' ° Secrist's only intention in disclosing the inside information
was to publicly expose the company's fraudulent activities. Further,
Secrist could not be considered a tippee under the Directive, since
he obtained the inside information through his role as an officer of
the corporation, not directly or indirectly through an insider as
required in Article 2.
B. Inside Information
1. The Directive - Generally
Article 1 of the Directive defines inside information as "informa-
tion which has not been made public of a precise nature relating to
one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several
transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely
to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security
or securities in question."105
In the United States and under the Directive, insider trading
restrictions apply only when an insider or a tippee utilizes inside
information. The issue is what is "inside information"? United States
102. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 4.
103. See id. at art. 2.
104. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666-67. Although Secrist obtained his information "by virtue of
his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer," he
did not "take advantage of that information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or
disposing of for his own account or for the account of a third party ... securities ... to
which that information relates." Directive, supra note 6, at art. 2, 1.
105. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, 1.
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judicial decisions reflect a general consensus that, at a minimum,
inside information consists of material nonpublic information. 6
2. "Material"
(a) United States
In Basic v. Levinson, the United States Supreme Court set forth
the standard of materiality for Section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5. 07 In
Basic, Basic Incorporated held several meetings with another company
concerning the possibility of a merger. Both the media and the New
York Stock Exchange questioned the company regarding unusual
trading activity in Basic stock. Basic Incorporated responded by
making three public statements denying the occurrence of any ne-
gotiations which might affect the stock's activity. 08 Shareholders of
Basic who sold shares after the public statements but before the
merger, brought a lOb-5 claim alleging that the merger negotiations
constituted a material fact and that the public announcements were
materially misleading. 1' 9 The District Court granted summary judg-
ment for Basic on the merits, holding as a matter of law that any
misstatements were immaterial, since negotiations were not destined
with reasonable certainty to become a merger agreement." 0 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
District Court's summary judgment, reasoning that although Basic
was under no general duty to disclose its discussions, any statement
the company voluntarily released could not be so incomplete as to
mislead. 1"
106. Pitt, Snyder & Caplan, Liability for Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities
Laws, in 2 SEc. ENFORCEMENT INs. 217, 236 (1988) [hereinafter Pitt, Snyder & Caplan].
107. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988). In Basic, the Supreme Court
expressly adopted "the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5 context." See TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 499 (1976). See also Pitt,
Snyder & Caplan, supra note 106, at 255. The most frequently cited definition of materiality
for federal securities cases is promulgated in TSC Industries. TSC Industries was not an insider
trading case. The dispute involved a stockholder claiming that a proxy statement was "incom-
plete and materially misleading in violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." TSC Industries, 422 U.S. at 441. The Court held that "an omitted fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote." Id. at 449. "There must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id.
108. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981.
109. Id. at 980-81.
110. Id. at 982.
111. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court ruled that in order to fulfill the
materiality requirement of a Rule lOb-5 claim, "there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available."11 2 In addition,
the Court held that materiality "depends on the facts and thus is to
be determined on a case-by-case basis."1
3
The Supreme Court remanded this case to the Court of Appeals
which held that materiality "is a function of the probability that the
transaction will be consummated and [of the] significance [of the
transaction] to the issuer of the securities. 1 1 4 Applying the Supreme
Court definition of materiality, the appellate court found that Basic's
public statements denying the merger negotiations substantially af-
fected the activity of the stock, and were therefore material." 5
(b) The Directive
The portion of Article l's definition of inside information which
requires a "significant effect on the price" of the security can be
analogized to the materiality requirement stated in Basic v. Levin-
son. 1 6 Under both U.S. law and the Directive, inside information
must be of some value to the reasonable investor. This qualification
of reasonableness is important since it prevents the possibility of
imposing penalties on those who have used inside information which
is of no value to the reasonable investor.
17
Although analogous, the Directive's "significant effect on the price
requirement" is not equivalent to the materiality requirement under
U.S. law. In contrast to the American concept of "materiality", the
Directive's scope is narrower, in that it encompasses a smaller spec-
trum of information. The U.S. condition that information must be
substantially likely to significantly alter "the total mix of information
made available,"" 8 is broader than the Directive's requirement that
112. Id. at 983.
113. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993.
114. Levinson v. Basic, 871 F.2d 562, 564 n.l (6th Cir. 1989).
115. Id.
116. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, 1. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 983.
117. Such a rule is not in conformity with the previously stated policy behind insider
trading sanctions. One of the main policies behind insider trading sanctions is to prevent
certain investors from having an unfair advantage over other investors. Berger, supra note
note 3, at 222. An assurance that investors are on an equal footing instills in other investors
a confidence in the market, thus increasing trading activity within the market. Id.
118. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 983.
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the information is likely to significantly affect the price of the
security. Information may alter the total mix of information without
significantly affecting the price of the pertinent security. 119
Arguably, differences in the meaning and application of materiality
between the Directive and U.S. law is insignificant. One commentator
has argued that in order for information to be material, it "must be
of the sort that will be important enough to the investing public to
cause a price movement when it becomes publicly available."'2 0
However, even if this theory, which requires a fluctuation in price
when the information is publicly disclosed, were accepted in the
United States, a substantial difference between the two laws would
remain. The Directive requires that the information, if disclosed,
would have a significant effect on the price.' 21 Although the Directive
does not state how great the anticipated impact on price must be in
order to be significant, the Directive's requirement apparently extends
beyond the U.S. requirement of a mere "price movement."
When one considers the purpose of the Directive,1n the Directive's
qualification on inside information may be too narrow. The Direc-
tive's preamble discusses both the necessity of inspiring investor
confidence in the market,1n and of making every effort to ensure
that the market operates smoothly. 1 4 Overly broad restrictions may
inhibit market transactions by causing investors unnecessary appre-
hension of sanctions. However, a transaction would arguably be
inhibited only when its legality was questionable in the first place.
Thus, such an inhibition may be deemed desirable in discouraging
legally questionable transactions. On the other hand, the Directive's
"significant price movement" requirement may create an undesirable
inhibition due to its seemingly narrow approach. The inhibition may
decrease confidence in potential investors who regard the restrictions
as impotent and unable to achieve the intended purposes of the
Directive. This lack of confidence in the market is exactly what the
Directive was designed to correct. Therefore, the Directive's narrow
application may contribute to its ultimate ineffectiveness.
119. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, 1.
120. LANGEVOORT, supra note 51, at 155.
121. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, 1.
122. See supra Introduction, p. 232.
123. Directive, supra note 6, at preamble.
124. Id.
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3. "Nonpublic"
Under U.S. law, information is "nonpublic" if "it is not generally
available to the investing public. ' 125 This requirement is similar to,
but not synonymous with, the Directive's requirement that inside
information be that "which has not been made public." 126 In the
United States, courts have adopted the "efficient market hypothesis"
to determine when information becomes public. 27 Under this analysis,
once a significant number of investors obtain the information, the
market price will reflect the significance of the information. At this
point, the market will have internalized the information so that
profitable insider trading is no longer possible. 28 In light of U.S.
treatment of similar language, 29 it is highly likely that the Directive's
broad language on this point will be judicially expounded upon. The
efficient market hypothesis was a logical extension and interpretation
of the nonpublic requirement in the United States. The similarity in
language between the standards set forth in the United States and
by the Directive requiring that information be nonpublic suggests
that the EC will expound upon the notion of limiting insider trading
restrictions to information "which has not been made public.'
'130
4. Application of Basic facts to the Directive
In applying the Directive to the facts of Basic v. Levinson, the
information concerning Basic's merger would be considered inside
information under Article 1 of the Directive.' The merger infor-
mation clearly had not been made public. In addition, in order to
conceal the information from the public, representatives of Basic
made several public announcements falsely denying the possibility of
a merger. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
once stated that a transaction "in which [a small corporation] is
bought or sold is the most important event that can occur in a small
corporation's life, to wit, its death."' 3 2 Under Judge Friendly's
125. LANoEvooRT, supra note 51, at 168.
126. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, 1.
127. LANGBvooRT, supra note 51, at 168.
128. Id. at 168-69.
129. See id. at 168 (discussion of nonpublic information).
130. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, 1.
131. Id.
132. SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976).
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rationale, information of a merger is likely to affect the reasonable
investor's decision on whether to acquire or dispose of securities
issued by the merging corporation. As this type of information may
be the most significant information in a corporation's history, it is
likely to have a significant effect on the price of the merged com-
pany's securities and hence, be considered material. Under the Di-
rective, the information in Basic would be considered "inside
information" since the type of merger discussed above was the type
contemplated by the parties.
III. SANCTIONS
A. The Directive
The Directive does not stipulate sanctions for violating the restric-
tions of the Directive. Article 13 of the Directive states that "[e]ach
Member State shall determine the penalties to be applied for infringe-
ment of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. The penalties
shall be sufficient to promote compliance with those measures."' 33
The European Council may have taken this deferential approach to
assure adoption of the Directive by all twelve of the Member States,
including those with indifferent sentiment towards insider trading. 134
However, by allowing each Member State to adopt its own set of
individually distinct sanctions, Article 13 may create a loophole,
giving Member States the opportunity to circumvent the Directive
through inadequate deterrence. The Member States that currently do
not offer trading protection are likely to impose inadequate sanctions
with little or no deterrent effect. Thus, Article 13 can be seen as the
Directive's weakest section. Furthermore, due to the failure of the
Council to stipulate sanctions, several areas of concern arise.
B. United States - The Need for Effective Deterrence
Prior to 1984, criminal prosecutions for insider trading were rare
in the United States. 35 Civil actions brought by the SEC were limited
133. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 13, 1.
134. Parliament took the view that Article 13 "did not go far enough, and that it was not
sufficient to require that penalties be [imposed]; the penalties for insider trading in the different
Member States had also to be harmonized." AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR COUNcIL DImcTsM,
supra note 3, at 3. The Commission rejected the Parliament's suggestions to amend Article
13, stating that "harmonization of criminal penalties would cause not only political but also
legal problems." Id. at 4. The Council agreed with the Commission, stating that "no matter
how heavy penalties were they could never ensure absolute compliance with the measures taken
under the directive." Id. at 6.
135. LANGEvOORT, supra note 51, at 18; Comment, Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their
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to seeking disgorgement of profits from past insider trading and
seeking injunctive relief from potential future insider trading.136 Cou-
pled with the difficulty of establishing violations of insider trading
restrictions, injunctions and forfeiture of profits were not seen as
effective deterrents. 3 7 Many insiders believed the perceived benefits
of insider trading outweighed its potential burdens.
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984138 was an attempt by
Congress and the SEC to rectify the ineffective laws regarding insider
trading. 13 9 The 1984 Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934140 by adding Section 21(d)(2). 141 Section 21(d)(2) permits the
court, in actions brought by the SEC, to impose a civil penalty of
up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided on those who are
found to have violated insider trading restrictions under the Securities
Exchange Act. 142 Thus, the court feasibly could obtain both disgorge-
ment of profits and treble damages, resulting in a monetary sanction
of up to four times the original amount of profit obtained or loss
avoided. 143 Although determining the amount of damages to impose
rests in the discretion of the court, the legislative history of the Act
indicates Congress' desire to impose maximum damages as the rule
and not the exception. 144
Continuing insider trading scandals after 1984 indicated that the
1984 Act was not effective in deterring violations of securities laws.
In 1988, the SEC filed an extraordinarily large complaint against
Relation to Substantive Law: Ramifications under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,
20 VA. U.L. REv. 575, 576 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Ramifications] (in the past, the
United States has had difficulty curbing insider trading offenses); Note, A Critique of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REv. 455, 455 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
Critique]. The lack of success of insider trading sanctions is evidenced by a continuously high
rate of insider trading offenses. Id. at 462. See also Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984 and its Effect on Existing Law, 1985 Sac. L. Rav. 187, 189 [hereinafter Langevoort,
Insider Trading Sanctions] (attributing problem to lack of effective means of deterrence).
136. Comment, Ramifications, supra note 135, at 576.
137. Langevoort, Insider Trading Sanctions, supra note 135, at 189.
138. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1265 (1984)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78c, 78t, 78u, 78ff (Supp. I 1984)).
139. Comment, Ramifications, supra note 135, at 577.
140. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1987).
141. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1265 (1984)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78c, 78t, 78u, 78ff (Supp. 11 1984)).
142. Note, Critique, supra note 135, at 456. The treble damages penalty may be imposed
in addition to any other penalty. Langevoort, Insider Trading Sanctions, supra note 135, at
195.
143. Langevoort, Insider Trading Sanctions, supra note 135, at 195.
144. Id. The legislative history indicated the difficulty of detecting insider trading and the
need for stronger deterrence. Id. at 192-93. This legislative intent is based on the same rationale
as that which prompted the Securities Exchange Act of 1984.
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Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., charging the corporation with, among
other things, insider trading violations. 14 One week after this suit
was filed, the House of Representatives unanimously passed H.R.
5133,146 a bill which was subsequently enacted as the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).147
The ITSFEA contained three main provisions which enhanced the
remedies available under the Securities Exchange Act. First, the 1988
Act repealed Section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act, and
replaced it with Section 21A. 148 Section 21A imposes new responsi-
bilities on those who control or employ inside traders or tippers, and
maintains the prior responsibilities on the actual insiders and tip-
pees. 149 The statute differentiates between controlling persons who
are broker-dealers or investment advisors, and other types of con-
trolling persons. Next, Section 21A(b)(1)(A) provides that a control-
ling person may be held liable for civil penalties if the Commission
establishes that "such controlling person knew or recklessly disre-
garded the fact that such controlled person was likely to engage in
the act or acts of constituting the violation and failed to take
appropriate steps to prevent such acts before they occurred."15 0 Under
Section 21A(b)(1)(A), a controlling person may not indifferently close
his eyes if he knows, or recklessly ignores, the likelihood of an
employee trading on inside information.' Inherent in this concept
is the requirement that controlling persons will establish adequate
policies and procedures for the dissemination and use of material
information.152
If a controlling person is a broker-dealer or investment advisor,
he also may be liable under Section 21A(b)(1)(B).5 3 Under this
section, liability may be imposed if the Commission declares that
145. Aldave, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An
Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALE. L. Ra,. 893, 894-95 (1988) [hereinafter Aldave]. "Last year
the company agreed to pay a $650 million dollar fine and pleaded guilty to six counts of mail
and securities fraud. As part of the settlement, federal prosecutors required Drexel to dump
Milken, who now faces a 98-count fraud and racketeering indictment." Greenwald, Predator's
Fall, Thm, Feb. 26, 1990, at 46, 48.
146. Aldave, supra note 145, at 895.
147. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (to be codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§
78c(a)(50), 78o, 78tA, 78(u)(a), 78ii(c), 80b-i, 78ff(a), 35(c)) [hereinafter ITSFEA].
148. Aldave, supra note 145, at 905-06.
149. ITSFEA, supra note 147, at §§ 3(a)(2), 21A(a)(3); 102 Stat. at 4678.
150. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-78hh-1, 21A(b)(1)(A); LANaEvooRT,
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 215 (1989) [hereinafter LANGEVOORT 1989].
151. LAGEVooRT 1989, supra note 150, at 215.
152. Id. at 216.
153. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78hh-1, 21A(b)(1)(B).
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"such controlling persons knowingly or recklessly failed to establish,
maintain or enforce any policy or procedure required under section
15(f) of this title or section 204A of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940 and such failure substantially contributed to or permitted the
occurrence of the act or acts constituting the violation."'1 54 Section
21A(b)(1)(B) requires securities firms to make a bona fide effort to
curb insider trading. 15
This section provides that the trading or tipping sanction "shall
be determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances,
but shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as
a result of [the] unlawful purchase, sale or communication."' 156 The
penalty imposed on the controlling person shall not exceed "the
greater of $1,000,000 or three times the amount of the profit gained
or loss avoided as a result of such controlled person's violation.' 15 7
Where liability is based on the controlled person's tipping, rather
than trading, the profits portion of the penalty is based on trading
by direct tippees, not remote ones. However, except for the limit
imposed by the profit penalty, the exact amount of the penalty
remains dependent on the relevant "facts and circumstances" of the
case. "
Besides enhancing civil liability remedies, the ITSFEA also strength-
ens two other areas of insider trading law. The Act amends Section
32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act by increasing the criminal
penalties for insider trading. 159 Under this amended section, penalties
for any person who willfully violates any provision of the Act, or a
rule or regulation thereunder, are increased from $100,000 to
$1,000,000.60 This amended section also increases the potential jail
sentence from 5 to 10 years and increases the fine imposed upon
nonnatural persons from $500,000 to $2,500,000.161 Further, the Act
154. Id. Section 15(f) provides:
"every registered broker or dealer shall establish, maintain, and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature of
such broker's or dealer's business, to prevent the misuse in violation of this title,
or the rules or regulations thereunder, of material, nonpublic information by such
broker or dealer or any person associated with such broker or dealer."
Id. at § 15(f). Section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act is an identical provision with
respect to registered policies or procedures. LANGEVOORT 1989, supra note 150, at 218.
155. LAN O EVOORT 1989, supra note 150, at 220.
156. ITSFEA, supra note 147, at §§ 3(a)(2), 21A(a)(2); 102 Stat. at 4678.
157. Id.
158. LANOEVOORT 1989, supra note 150, at 212.
159. ITSFEA, supra note 147, at § 4; 102 Stat. at 4680.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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establishes an express private right of action for "contemporaneous"
investors against traders, tippers and controlling persons who violate
insider trading restrictions. 162 In broadly permitting a private right of
action for contemporaneous investors, this amendment is conceptually
the most far reaching change in law under the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.163
C. European Community Today - Differences Among the
Member States
Based on existing laws in the twelve Member States, each country
probably will adopt its own set of sanctions, separate and distinct
from the other Member States. Currently, only the United Kingdom,
France and Denmark have enacted insider trading statutes, 16  while
the Federal Republic of Germany utilizes a set of voluntary rules.
65
Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands have proposed insider trading
legislation. 16 Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg have
neither imposed voluntary nor mandatory restrictions, nor have they
drafted legislative proposals designed to create restrictions. 67 If the
Member States adopt diverse sanctions, the Directive may be rendered
ineffective. In order to truly obtain adherence to the provisions of
the Directive, minimum harmonization of the sanctions is necessary.
1. Member States with Existing Sanctions
(a) United Kingdom
Prior to 1980, the United Kingdom did not regulate insider trad-
ing.'68 Insider trading became a criminal offense in England when
162. Section 20A(a) states:
Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneous with the purchase or sale of
securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation
is based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a purchase
of securities) securities of the same class.
.1d. at § 20A; 102 Stat. at 4678.
163. LANOEVOORT 1989, supra note 150, at 242-43.




168. Comment, Recent Developments in Insider Trading Laws and Problems of Enforce-
ment in Great Britain, 12 B.C. Irr'L & Comp. L. REv. 265, 267 (1989) [hereinafter Comment,
Insider Trading Laws in Great Britain].
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the British government enacted the Companies Act of 1980.169 In
1985, the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act was enacted. 170
The 1985 enactment consolidated prior insider trading laws and
bolstered the laws by providing sanctions.' 7 ' The 1985 Act imposed
a maximum criminal penalty of two years imprisonment, or fine, or
both.' 72 Civil actions could be brought under the Financial Services
Act of 1986.1
71
Although the United Kingdom has enacted several regulations
restricting insider trading, it may not be able to effectively regulate
insider trading, as the government may not be prepared to invest the
necessary resources. 74 The British criminal justice system has been
accused of failing to take the offense seriously. 17  Between 1980,
when insider trading became potentially criminal, and mid-1988, only
seven insider trading charges were successfully prosecuted.' 76 Given
Britain's history of failure to prosecute insider trading violations,
enactment of the Directive probably will not motivate the British
government to invest additional resources into the effort to curb
insider trading. Without a guarantee that the other Member States
also will impose a minimum level of sanctions, the British courts are
equally unlikely to utilize the sanctions provided by the 1985 Act.
(b) France
France made insider trading a crime in 1970.177 Under the Law of
1970,178 sanctions consisted of imprisonm ent ranging from two months
to two years, and/or a maximum fine of five million Francs or four
times the gain.' 79 Although civil liability was theoretically available,
169. Note, Insider-Trading Liability in Great Britain and Singapore: Can Regulatory
Harmonization Close the Floodgates to Fraud on the Internationalized Markets?, 14 BRooKLYN
J. INT'L L. 357, 363 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Insider Trading in Great Britain & Singapore].
170. Id. at 363-64.
171. Id.
172. Comment, Insider Trading Laws in Great Britain, supra note 168, at 280.
173. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §§ 177-78; Barnard, United Kingdom Financial
Services Act, 1986: A New Regulatory Framework, 21 INT'L LAW. 343 (1987).
174. Note, Insider Trading in Great Britain & Singapore, supra note 169, at 377.
175. Id.
176. Comment, Insider Trading Laws in Great Britain, supra note 168, at 283. By
comparison, since 1981, the SEC has brought over 100 successful insider trading prosecutions.
Id.
177. Tune, The Reform of French Insider Trading Law, 4(5) THE ComArY LAW. 205,
205 (Sept. 1983).
178. Law No. 70-1208 of 23 Dec. arts. 8 & 9 of the 1970 Law added a new art. 10-1 into
the 1967 Ordonnance.
179. Wallace, Who is Subject to the Prohibition Against Insider Trading: A Comparative
Study of American, British and French Law, 15 Sw. U.L. Rv. 217, 227 (1985) [hereinafter
Wallace].
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it was not considered a practical alternative due to its technical
difficulties, expense and uncertainty. 80 The impracticality of civil
sanctions led to the enactment of the Law of 1983.181 The Law of
1983 revised and strengthened many aspects of the prior French
insider trading law. 182 One revision required that the minimum fine
imposed must equal or surpass the amount of the insider's profit. 8 1
The 1983 reforms reflected the French government's recognition of
the seriousness of the insider trading problem.'m The Law of 1983
is analogous to the United States' Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Both laws were promulgated on the
perceived need to crack down on insider trading, as well as the belief
that existing restrictions and sanctions were inadequate. Due to its
established attitude against insider trading, France is likely to comply
with the Directive's Article 13 requirement that each Member State




The final Member State with active insider trading legislation is
Denmark. Insider trading legislation was introduced in Denmark in
June, 1986.186 Under the 1986 enactment, those who violate insider
trading restrictions face an unlimited criminal fine. 87 The threat of
imposing an unlimited fine may sufficiently sanction insider trading
to effectively promote compliance with the Directive's restrictions. If
so, Denmark's present legislation will have met Article 13 stan-
dards. 188 Thus, Denmark is likely to continue imposing its present
stringent sanctions, thereby complying with the Article 13 require-
ments.
2. Member States with Voluntary Sanctions
(a) Germany
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the only existing means of
restricting insider trading is the German Insider Trading Guidelines
180. Id. at 230-31.
181. Surya, France - Strengthening the Laws on Insider Trading, 5 Tmn CoMPANY LAw.
244, 244 (Sept. 1984).
182. Id.
183. Wallace, supra note 179, at 231.
184. Id. at 233.
185. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 13, 1.
186. Note, Unification, supra note 8, at 442.
187. Id.
188. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 13, 1.
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of July 1, 1976.189 These guidelines are voluntary rules. 190 Submission
to the model code usually is accomplished by means of private
contract between companies and insiders belonging to those compa-
nies.191 A review panel, composed of business and finance association
representatives, determines whether a violation of the guidelines has
occurred.'92 Because the guidelines are voluntary and nonstatutory,
the review panel, upon finding a violation, is not permitted to impose
criminal sanctions. The primary sanction available to the panel is
that of awarding the insider's unjust profits to the company which
suffered from the inside trading. 193 In extreme cases involving gross
negligence, publication of the case without prior consent of the insider
is permitted. 194 The effectiveness of the guidelines is further restricted
by a dual statute of limitations within the German Act on Stock
Corporations.' 95 A company must exercise its claim for a transfer of
the profits within either three months after it learns of the insider
trading, or up to five years after the trading occurred. 9 6 If the
company fails to do so within the statutory time period, it loses its
claim, and disgorgement may not be imposed.' 97
The voluntary German Insider Trading Guidelines are an ineffective
device to combat insider trading. Fewer than one quarter of all
German stock corporations have adopted the German Insider Trading
Guidelines.' 98 Additionally, although a significant number of review
panel investigations have been conducted, few have resulted in insider
liability, often in spite of strong prima facie evidence of insider
trading. , 9
In order to comply with Article 13, Germany will need to adopt
mandatory insider trading sanctions. To deter insider trading, these
sanctions must extend beyond existing sanctions available to the
review panel. Merely returning unjust profits is an insufficient deter-
rent to insider trading, particularly when one considers the potential
189. Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-Restraint?,
7 Nw. J. ITr'L L. & Bus. 507, 516 (1986) [hereinafter Blum].
190. Id.
191. Hopt, The German Insider Trading Guidelines - Spring-Gun Or Scarecrow?, 8 J.




195. GEaam ACT ON STOCK CORPORATIONS (AKTmNOEsETZ), § 88 (3) (Sept. 6, 1965, as
amended).
196. Hopt, supra note 191, at 388-89.
197. Id.
198. Note, Unification, supra note 8, at 444.
199. Blum, supra note 189, at 524.
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monetary benefits which may be derived from insider trading.
The current attitude towards insider trading and the Directive
aggravates the difficulty of effectively revising insider trading laws
in Germany. A large majority of companies have refused to adopt
the guidelines, indicating a renunciation of insider trading law by the
business community. 200 In addition, a number of authorities have
expressed their skepticism towards adopting mandatory legal sanc-
tions.20 1 Indeed, Germany's leary attitude towards insider trading may
have partially motivated the Council to exclude a provision mandating
sanctions in the Directive.
Although Germany conceivably could adopt statutory sanctions
necessary to comply with Article 13, 202 it also may create statutes
which are little more than a facade of legislative lip service. The sole
purpose of adopting the sanctions may be to appease the other
Member States, without any intention of utilizing the sanctions to
their full extent. By 1986, ten years after the inception of the Insider
Trading Guidelines, the review board had failed to find a single
significant violation; this ten-year record demonstrates a realistic




In the Netherlands, pressure to penalize insider trading increased
in the early 1980s.21 During this period securities trade increased,
new financial markets were developed, the EC Directive was pro-
posed, and other Member States had either created or toughened
their insider trading sanctions. 205 Responding to these changes, the
Netherlands, in January, 1987, adopted a self-regulating insider trad-
ing directive to govern the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE), the
Netherlands' only official stock exchange. 206 Limited both in scope
and power, this model code is similar to the German Insider Trading
200. Hopt, supra note 191, at 392-93.
201. One of these authorities is Judge Kissel, former president of the Board of Inquiry of
the Frankfurt Exchange. Judge Kissel warned that "enforcement of an insider trading law by
a state agency or by the courts would be completely inefficient." Blum, supra note 189, at
528.
202. Hopt, supra note 191, at 393-94.
203. Blum, supra note 189, at 524.
204. van Welsen, The Netherlands - Proposed Changes in Dutch Securities Regulations,
10(5) THE CombPeY LAW. 119, 120 (May 1989) [hereinafter van Welsen].
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Guidelines. The model code applies only to members, employees and
listed companies, 2 7 and its enforcement powers extend only to a
limited group of potential insiders. 20 1 During an insider trading in-
vestigation, the ASE may not compel cooperation from outsiders. 2°9
Presently, legislation has been proposed which would make insider
trading a criminal offense in the Netherlands. 210 If passed, this
legislation will apply to all three stock exchanges operating in the
Netherlands. 21" The proposed legislation may be analogized to the
United States Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988. Both statutes were created due to a heightened awareness
of insider trading and a perceived need to deter the offense through
harsher sanctions. 212 Several of the sanctions imposed in the United
States are similar to the sanctions mandated under the Netherlands'
proposed legislation. The Netherlands' proposed sanctions include a
fine of up to NLG 100,000 for physical persons, and NLG 1,000,000
for corporations.2 1 1 If the profit gained from the insider trading
exceeds the statutory fine amount, the offender may be liable for up
to four times the profit made.21 4 The Dutch legislation also permits
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. van Welsen, supra note 204, at 120.
210. Id. The newly proposed legislation contains the following pertinent provisions:
para. 1-The person who, while possessing inside information, undertakes or accom-
plishes a transaction in The Netherlands in securities which are listed at a state-
supervised exchange, will, in case an advantage can result from the transaction, be
punished with a prison sentence of two years and a fine of the fifth category, or
one of these penalties.
Inside information is the knowledge of a particularity about the corporation or
joint stock company to which the securities relate, or about the trade in the securities:
(a) of which the person possessing knowledge of the particularity knows or, on
the basis of reasonableness, should suspect that it is not public, and that it could
not come, or has not come outside the group of persons bound to keep the secret
without violation of this secret and
(b) of which the disclosure, as can reasonably be expected, will affect the price
of the securities.
para. 2-With the same penalty will be punished the person who, while possessing
inside information, undertakes or accomplishes a transaction from The Netherlands
in securities listed at an exchange situated outside The Netherlands, if an advantage
can result from the transaction.
para. 3-Not punishable is the intermediary who, only possessing inside information
relating to the trade in securities, transacts through the exchange in accordance with
the rules of good faith, as to serve its principal.
Id. (citing the unofficial translation of art. 366(a) of the Penal Code).
211. Id. at 121. The three stock exchanges in the Netherlands are the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange, the Amsterdam Financial Futures Market, and the EOE.
212. See Comment, Ramifications, supra note 135, at 577; van Welsen, supra note 204, at
120.
213. van Welsen, supra note 204, at 120.
214. Note, Unification, supra note 8, at 445.
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the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor to impose a two year prison
sentence.215 The possible success of the proposed Dutch legislation in
deterring insider trading sufficiently to comply with Article 13 is
difficult to predict. 216
(c) Belgium
Present law in Belgium does not forbid insider trading. 27 Currently,
the regulation of securities markets in Belgium is monitored by several
public bodies, including the Listing Committee, the Stock Exchange
Commission and the Banking Commission. 28 The Banking Commis-
sion is an independent government agency which supervises a large
portion of the private financial sector. 219 Recognizing the problems
caused by insider trading, the Banking Commission has repeatedly
condemned it as an unfashionable and unethical business practice.
220
Although the Commission has a wide range of regulatory power over
the securities and banking industries, it has not utilized this power
to curb insider trading. 221 The Commission's main deterrence efforts
have consisted of recommendations to the industry to adopt higher
standards of practice.m Failure to enforce these recommendations is
due to the recommendation's lack of a clear legal basis?23
Belgium has been considering the implementation of insider trading
legislation since the late 1970s.?2 The proposed legislation is partially
attributable to an effort to conform Belgian law to the EEC's
Directives.? Under the proposed legislation, insider trading is con-
sidered a criminal act for which offenders are subject to sanctions,
including imprisonment for up to one year and a maximum fine of
40,000B.fr.?3 Insiders also may be civilly liable for any profits
realized or loss avoided due to the insider trading. 227 If enacted, this
215. van Welsen, supra note 204, at 120. The prosecution of insider dealing cases will
generally be the task of the public prosecutor in Amsterddin due to a change in the Penal
Procedure Code. Id.
216. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 13, 1.
217. E. WYmERSCH, BELGIUM - BooK=r 1: CoMmml TARY, 1 INT'L SEC. REo. 20 (R. Rosen
ed. 1988) [hereinafter WymmRscH].
218. Id. at 5.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 5, 20.
221. RIDER & FFRENCn, supra note 1, at 254-55.
222. Id. at 254.
223. WYmEE.SCH, supra note 217, at 20.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Note, Unification, supra note 8, at 445.
227. Id.
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legislation certainly would provide more effective deterrence of insider
trading. Whether the proposed sanctions are sufficiently stringent to
force compliance with the Directive remains to be seen. These sanc-
tions are less threatening than both the proposed Netherlands sanc-
tions and the existing French sanctions. Even though Belgium imposes
a one year imprisonment sanction, its monetary sanction may prove
inadequate. Limiting the fine for violation of insider trading restric-
tions may decrease the Directive's potential to deter insider trading.
3. Member States Without Insider Trading Sanctions: Ireland,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece
The remaining six Member States, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Italy, Spain, and Greece, do not regulate insider trading; only recently
has Ireland proposed legislation prohibiting insider trading.2 The
lack of existing or proposed restrictions in these five Member States
is indicative of their indifference towards insider trading.
The Member States with inadequate sanctions may attempt to
evade compliance with Article 13 of the Directive, and the language
of this article may be sufficiently vague so as to enable these Member
States to do so. The Directive does not stipulate in what fashion the
Member States are to determine when sufficient compliance has been
achieved. Furthermore, because each Member State is permitted to
determine its own sanctions, the question arises whether each Member
State has exclusive power to determine if sufficient compliance exists.
D. The Need for a Uniform Minimum Level of Sanctions
Article 13 is the Directive's Achilles heel. It enables Member States
such as Germany, Italy, and Portugal to avoid meaningful deterrence
of insider trading. By failing to adopt and enforce effective sanctions,
these Member States have impliedly consented to the continued
practice of insider trading. The resulting inefficiency of the Directive
in these countries inhibits the free flow of capital, one of the primary
purposes of the 1957 Treaty of Rome.229
If the Member States genuinely believe in the premise of the
Directive, that insider trading must be deterred in all Member States
because it inhibits the free flow of capital, the European Community
228. Id. at 445-46. These current proposals have not yet been published. Id. at 445
229. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 345. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text
(discussing Treaty of Rome).
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eventually must adopt a uniform minimum level of sanctions. In
order to be effective, these sanctions should include both imprison-
ment and monetary fines. In considering a minimum level of sanc-
tions, the proposed Netherlands legislation may be an acceptable
model. The United States insider trading sanctions may also provide
a workable model; however, the success of the U.S. sanctions in
deterring insider trading is still uncertain. Both the United States and
the Netherlands impose fines of up to four times the profit made or
loss avoided due to the -insider trading. The Dutch legislation also
permits a maximum two year prison sentence for violating insider
trading restrictions.20
Uniform minimum sanctions, established at a sufficient level
throughout the EC, would eliminate the attraction of insiders to
Member States with lenient sanctions, as well as the compulsion of
other investors to invest only in those Member States with strict
sanctions. An acceptable minimum standard of investor protection
throughout the EC would achieve the initial aim of the Directive,
thereby enhancing the free flow of capital throughout the Member
States.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Directive imposes several restrictions on insider trading. Both
insiders and tippees are prohibited from using inside information
through securities investments to their benefit. The Directive also
restricts insiders from conveying inside information to a third party,
or recommending that a third party purchase or divest securities
based on inside information. The scope of these restrictions is de-
pendent upon determining who is subject to the restrictions as an
insider or a tippee, and what type of data is considered inside
information.
In determining who should be characterized as an insider or a
tippee, the Directive differs from both U.S. law and a strict inter-
pretation of Dirks, primarily because of an absence of a fiduciary
duty requirement under the Directive. Based on this difference, the
Directive's restrictions are more similar to U.S. law prior to the 1980
Chiarella decision and a broad interpretation of Dirks than to present
United States law. In addition, judicial expansion of the Directive
may take a different path than the evolution of defining insiders and
230. van Welsen, supra note 204, at 120.
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tippees under Rule lOb-5. The fraud element, which was the catalyst
in Chiarella, caused Justice Powell to subsequently infer a fiduciary
duty in both the insider and the tippee definitions. In contrast, the
Directive does not indicate that the Council intended fraud to be an
element in defining insiders and tippees. This difference permits the
Directive to encompass a broader range of activity than does United
States law.
Both U.S. law and the Directive have included in their definitions
of inside information a requirement that the information be non-
public. The United States uses the efficient market hypothesis to
define when information is considered nonpublic. Member States
likely will adopt a similar hypothesis to determine whether infor-
mation is nonpublic.
In addition to the nonpublic requirement, the United States also
requires that the information be material in order to be considered
inside information. Basic v. Levinson provides the mandate that
"there be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."
The Directive's definition of inside information contains a similar
requirement. The information must "be likely to have a significant
effect on the price" of the security. On this point, U.S. law encom-
passes a broader range of transactions by loosely requiring that the
information affect the reasonable investor's compilation of infor-
mation. On the other hand, the Directive requires that the infor-
mation be likely to affect significantly the price of the security. This
stricter requirement limits the Directive's scope, and as a result,
ultimately may limit the effectiveness of the Directive.
Although the Directive's restrictions are somewhat comparable to
the United States restrictions, the lack of harmonization of the
sanctions renders the entire Directive ineffective for all practical
purposes. The impetus behind the Council's decision to allow each
Member State to impose its own sanctions was politically motivated.
In order to gain acceptance by all the Member States, the Council
was forced to allot enforcement power to each Member State. The
extremely diverse approaches to insider trading which exist among
the Member States will be reflected in their sanctions. The resulting
lack of uniform sanctions will cause investors to become suspicious
that the Directive has failed to put them on equal footing with other
investors in other Member States. This lack of investor confidence
will inhibit the interpenetration of securities markets in the Coin-
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munity. Enhancing the free flow of capital among the Member States
was the intended purpose of the Directive, and it is this purpose
which Article 13 frustrates.
Providing a minimum level of sanctions throughout the Member
States is critical to the success of the Directive. Without effective
deterrence, insiders and tippees will not comply with the Directive's
restrictions, particularly when one considers the potential benefits
gained from insider trading. If the EC truly believes in harmonizing
insider trading laws throughout the Member States, it will impose a
minimum level of sanctions. This minimum level should be suffi-
ciently. high to effectively deter insider trading.
Zachary Joseph Winner*
* Special thanks to Professor Don Berger and Professor Kojo Yelpaala for their
invaluable advice and assistance.
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APPENDIX I
Council Directive of 13 November 1989
Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having
regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,
and in particular Article lOOa thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, In Cooperation
with the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Social Committee,
Whereas Article 1Oa (1) of the Treaty states that the Council shall
adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
which have as their own object the establishment and functioning of
the internal market;
Whereas the secondary market in transferable securities plays an
important role in the financing of economic agents;
Whereas, for the market to be able to play its role effectively, every
measure should be taken to ensure that market operates smoothly;
Whereas the smooth operation of the market depends to a large
extent on the confidence it inspires in investors;
Whereas the factors on which such confidence depends include the
assurance afforded to investors that they are placed on an equal
footing and that they will be protected against the improper use of
inside information;
Whereas, by benefiting certain investors as compared with others,
insider dealing is likely to undermine that confidence and may
therefore prejudice the smooth operation of the market;
Whereas the necessary measures should therefore be taken to combat
insider dealing;
Whereas in some Member States there are no rules or regulations
prohibiting insider dealing and whereas the rules or regulations that
do exist differ considerably from one Member State to another;
Whereas it is therefore advisable to adopt coordinated rules at a
Community level in this field;
Whereas such coordinated rules also have the advantage of making
possible, through cooperation by the competent authorities, to com-
bat transfrontier insider dealing more effectively;
Whereas, since the acquisition or disposal of transferable securities
necessarily involves a prior decision to acquire or to dispose taken
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by the person who undertakes one or other of these operations, the
carrying-out of this acquisition or disposal does not constitute in
itself the use of inside information;
Whereas insider dealing involves taking advantage of inside infor-
mation; whereas the mere fact that marketmakers, bodies authorized
to act as contrapartie, or stockbrokers with inside information confine
themselves, in the first two cases, to pursuing their normal business
of buying or selling securities or, in the last, to carrying out an order
should not in itself be deemed to constitute use of such inside
information; whereas likewise the fact of carrying out such transac-
tions with the aim of stabilizing the price of new issues or secondary
offers of transferable securities should not itself be deemed to con-
stitute use of inside information;
Whereas estimates developed from publicly available data cannot be
regarded as inside information and whereas, therefore, any transac-
tion carried out on the basis of such estimates does not constitute
insider dealing within the meaning of this Directive;
Whereas communication of inside information to an authority, in
order to enable it to ensure that the provisions of this Directive or
other provisions in force are respected, obviously cannot be covered
by the prohibitions laid down by this Directive,
ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
For the purpose of this Directive:
1. 'inside information' shall mean information which has not been
made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of
transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities,
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant
effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in ques-
tion;
2. 'transferable securities' shall mean:
(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities equivalent to
shares and debt securities;
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of
securities referred to in (a);
(c) futures contracts, options and financial futures in respect of
securities referred to in (a);
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in (a), when
admitted to trading on a market which is regulated and supervised
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by authorities recognized by public bodies, operates regularly and is
accessible directly or indirectly to the public.
Article 2
1.
Each Member State shall prohibit any person who:
- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management
or supervisory bodies of the issuer,
- by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or
- because he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise
of his employment, profession or duties, possesses inside infor-
mation from taking advantage of that information with full knowl-
edge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account
or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly,
transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that infor-
mation relates.
2.
Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a company or
other type of legal person, the prohibition laid down in that para-
graph shall apply to the natural persons who take part in the decision
to carry out the transaction for the account of the legal person
concerned.
3.
The prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply to any
acquisition or disposal of transferable securities effected through a
professional intermediary.
Each Member state may provide that this prohibition shall not
apply to acquisitions or disposals of transferable securities effected
without the involvement of a professional* intermediary outside a
market as defined in Article 1 (2) in fine.
4.
This Directive shall not apply to transactions carried out in pursuit
of monetary, exchange-rate or public debt-management policies by a
sovereign State, by its central bank or any other body designated to
that effect by the State, or by any person acting on their behalf.
Member States may extend this exemption to their federated States
or similar local authorities in respect of the management of their
public debt.
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Article 3
Each Member State shall prohibit any person subject to the pro-
hibition laid down in Article 2 who possesses inside information
from:
(a) disclosing that inside information to any third party unless
such disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of his
employment, profession or duties;
(b) recommending or procuring a third party, on the basis of that
inside information, to acquire or dispose of transferable securities
admitted to trading on its securities markets as referred to in Article
1 (2) in fine.
Article 4
Each Member State shall also impose the prohibition provided for
in Article 2 on any person other than those referred to in that Article
who with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside information,the
direct or indirect source of which could not be other than a person
referred to in Article 2.
Article 5
Each Member State shall apply the prohibitions provided for in
Articles 2, 3 and 4, at least to actions undertaken within its territory
to the extent that the transferable securities concerned are admitted
to trading on a market of a Member State. In any event, each
Member State shall regard a transaction as carried out within its
territory if it is carried out within its territory if it is carried out on
a market, as defined in Article 1 (2) in fine, situated or operating
within that territory.
Article 6
Each Member State may adopt provisions more stringent than
those laid down by this Directive or additional provisions,provided
that such provisions are applied generally. In particular it may extend
the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 2 and impose on
persons referred to in Article 4 the prohibitions laid down in Article
3.
Article 7
The provisions of Schedule C.5 (a) of the Annex to the Directive
79/279/EEC shall also apply to companies and undertakings the
transferable securities of which, whatever their nature,are admitted
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Each Member State shall designate the administrative authority or
authorities competent, if necessary in collaboration with other au-
thorities to ensure that the provisions adopted pursuant to this
Directive are applied. It shall so inform the Commission which shall
transmit that information to all Member States.
2.
The competent authorities must be given all supervisory and in-
vestigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their func-
tions, where appropriate in collaboration with other authorities.
Article 9
Each Member State shall provide that all persons employed or
formerly employed by the competent authorities referredc [sic] to in
Article 8 shall be bound by professional secrecy. Information covered
by professional secrecy may not be divulged to any person or
authority except by virtue of provisions laid down by law.
Article 10
1.
The competent authorities in the Member States shall cooperate
with each other whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out
their duties, making use of powers mentioned in Article 8 (2). To
this end, and notwithstanding Article 9, they shall exchange any
information required for that purpose, including information relating
to actions prohibited, under the options given to Member States by
Article 5 and by the second sentence of Article 6, only by the
Member State requesting cooperation. Information thus exchanged
shall be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy to which
the persons employed or formerly employed by the competent au-
thorities receiving the information are subject.
2.
The competent authorities may refuse to act on a request for
information:
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(a) where communication of the information might adversely affect
the sovereignty, security or public policy of the State addressed;
(b) where judicial proceedings have already been initiated in respect
of the same actions and against the same persons before the author-
ities of the State addressed or where final judgment has already been
passed on such persons for the same actions by competent authorities
of the State addressed.
3.
Without prejudice to the obligations to which they are subject in
judicial proceeding under criminal law, the authorities which receive
information pursuant to paragraph 1 may use it only for the exercise
of their functions within the meaning of Article 8 (1) and in the
context of administrative or judicial proceedings specially relating to
the exercise of those functions. However, where the competent au-
thority communicating information consents thereto, the authority
receiving the information may use it for other purposes or forward
it to other States' competent authorities.
Article 11
The Community may, in conformity with the Treaty, conclude
agreements with non-member countries on the matters governed by
this Directive.
Article 12
The Contact Committee set up by Article 20 of Directive 79/279/
EEC shall also have as its function:
(a) to permit regular consultation on any practical problems which
arise from the application of this Directive and on which exchanges
of view are deemed useful;
(b) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on any additions or
amendments to be made to this Directive.
Article 13
Each Member State shall determine the penalties to be applied for
infringement of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. The




Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with
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this Directive before 1 June 1992. They shall forthwith inform the
Commission thereof.
2.
Member States shall communicate to the Commission the provi-
sions of national law which they adopt in the field governed by this
Directive.
Article 15
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 13 November 1989.
For the Council
The President
P. BEREGOVOY

